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BRAVE NEW WORLD WAR
Part II – Ten for the Boss

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In Part I of this essay, entitled "Why Leavenworth's finest know they're not in Kansas anymore" (Spring 2006), the author questioned whether the configuration of the national effort to combat the threat of terrorism takes sufficient account of success or failure as perceived by the adversary. One implication for combatant commands is that policy and public diplomacy have become more significant factors in the modern "battlespace." Part II offers advice arising from these non-traditional issues that, more than ever before, can impact the warfight and thus the commander's prosecution of the operation.

Capable civilian and military public servants rising through the ranks find that their preparation for more senior responsibilities consists largely of learning how the vast national security apparatus works, from the President down through Washington agencies to field operations on the civilian side and through the President, Secretary of Defense and military chain of command on the uniformed side.

It takes years, and changes in assignment or portfolio, to come to understand the workings of U.S. foreign and defense policy, to say nothing of military operations. For those who achieve decision-making levels, knowing how things are supposed to work is an essential qualification.

But true success in managing the crises that inevitably arise demands more than the wisdom accumulated from previous challenges. The blueprint or contingency plan to which one turns at the outset of a crisis anticipates everything except the circumstances of the new situation, which may or may not resemble the past. To succeed, leaders need to consider changes in why and how conflicts are fought and the fast evolution in Washington's own national security thinking during this decade.

What follows is an attempt to offer combatant command planners and staff some insights from the recent past, with an overall theme that the line between traditional military concerns and civilian policy concerns is being blurred on today's battlefield. Hopefully the ten suggestions that follow will stimulate future warfighters to expand their appreciation of issues that could impact their operations for better or worse.

Lincoln Bloomfield's swearing in ceremony attending by the Secretary of State Collin Powell

I. Inculcate the force with strategic as well as operational guidance – *Every person engaged in an operation should know not only the commander's intent but also the national objectives, and why both matter on the ground.*

As a civilian I have often been struck by the way policymakers in Washington find artful language to tell the nation why force must be committed, and how military commanders then employ entirely different language to tell soldiers at all echelons what they are supposed to do.

There is a reasonable explanation for this linguistic difference. Each verbal formulation serves a purpose. The civilian policy prose acknowledges and attempts to fulfill a series of criteria that have evolved through our nation's history. While not formalized or codified in any enduring legal or policy reference, these criteria perennially emerge in national debate over the commitment of military forces, whether to secure congressional authorization, win public support, or simply explain the nation's actions to the world at large.

Presidents invariably want it understood that the use of force is necessary for the defense of U.S. interests, appropriate in scope[i] to the dangers faced, and otherwise lawful and legitimate. One often hears talk from policymakers about the strategic nature of the stakes at issue, the potential costs of failure to act decisively, and the reasonable expectation that the contemplated actions will succeed.

When the time comes for the combatant commander to instruct the force on his intent in an operation that has been authorized by the President, the 'why' and 'wherefore' give way to the 'what' and 'how' – what is to be done, with what military means, and toward what intended result. A highly refined warfighting dialect whose menu appears to consist only of "d" verbs provides the answers. Our forces may be tasked to 'deter,' 'dissuade,' 'deny,' 'disrupt,' or 'degrade' adversary activities and capabilities. Of greatest import is what the force will be directed to 'destroy.'

The distinction between the strategic rationale surrounding a national commitment of force and the operational concept of what the force will seek to accomplish is important. As a government official overseeing a substantial workforce, I learned the power of communicating clear intent throughout the ranks of an organization. If people know what you want them to do, they will apply energy to their task, and operate more in harmony.

But whether we are speaking of military units or policy offices in Washington, there is more to a successful operation than assuring that subordinates carry out assigned tasks. A force all of whose people know why the operation is important to the nation and how its proper execution will serve the national interest over time – the moral and legal context for those tasks – is a force more likely to make day-to-day decisions on the ground that will advance the national interest strategically as well as tactically.

II. Look for help; take it – *Other friendly countries should be systematically encouraged to develop, and offer for contingencies, useful military capabilities; and U.S. forces should be ready to accept the help.*

Five years after 9/11, the U.S. Armed Forces as a whole are as capable as at any time in history due to the high worldwide ops tempo of recent years. Yet there is no avoiding the reality that our military has been paying a heavy and mounting price for its many global commitments and exertions, foremost in Iraq.

The costs are well known, measured in casualties, in personnel who, after multiple deployments, have chosen not to continue in the service, and in equipment prematurely worn out through continuous wartime use. Many believe that defense budget pressures are becoming acute as Congress is not keen to continue the pattern of very large wartime supplemental appropriations it has supported each year since 9/11.

[i] Some – not all – would say "proportionate" in scope to the dangers faced, believing that disproportionate use of lethal force is by definition excessive, a characteristic that they would argue detracts from its legitimacy. There are arguments as well to justify overwhelming, hence decisive, use of force.

CENTCOM blazed a trail in the early 2000s by establishing a cell of multinational liaison officers in Tampa as a useful conduit to determine which foreign forces would participate in the Afghanistan and Iraq coalitions, and what assistance they might require from the U.S. It was a good mechanism.

However, looking ahead, it is necessary and appropriate to configure U.S. peacetime engagement and wartime planning more comprehensively, at the national and institutional level, to provide for the greatest possibility of capable, sustainable, interoperable help from the forces of willing partner countries in future contingencies even though there is always the possibility that other countries will say no to our requests for help, or seek to impose political and operational constraints that the U.S. cannot accept in a future crisis. We must always be prepared to defend American interests unilaterally.

The next time a combatant command is tasked to work up a major combat operation, chances are it will not be a NATO Article V contingency where a member state has been attacked and the rest of the alliance comes to its defense. Hopefully it will not be a North Korean attack south of the 38th Parallel. Either of those crises would trigger elaborately refined planning, response and alliance coordination actions with our NATO or South Korean allies, respectively.

The more likely model will be a coalition. But even in the case of another *sui generis*, one-off contingency, there will be no need and, frankly, no excuse to treat it as a pick-up game when it comes to enlisting willing allies in the fight – not after all we have learned in the last five years.

A future characterized by military responses to crisis that amounted to a more-than-90 percent organic U.S. solution decorated with multinational frosting would create two liabilities for the United States. First, we would rob our forces of their transformational potential, stretching precious assets and diverting soldiers from more advanced roles to cover lesser tasks in the operational food chain for lack of any other boots on the ground.

Second, and arguably more costly for U.S. interests, we would encourage a pattern in international political relations where there was less solidarity between America and its friends on security matters. Americans, in such a world, would be universally seen as the only credible responders to serious security crises, and most other friendly countries would invest in defense capabilities only to the extent sufficient for local security concerns or for show-the-flag participation in UN, EU or other such missions.

At the dawn of this century, some self-described "neoconservatives" welcomed the specter of a unipolar world, where America could revel in a near-monopoly of military power. They embraced the view that unrivalled U.S. armed strength would naturally translate into a position of international political preeminence. They were wrong.

If anything, the military disparity made friend and foe alike more inclined to be jealous of their policy prerogatives in relation to U.S. interests. By 2003, the vaunted neoconservative "moment" had produced, in effect, a two-front war, as the Administration launched military hostilities in southwest Asia while at least some in Washington engaged in policy "hostilities"

with traditional allies, pressing their critiques on an array of differences with a demeanor previously reserved for adversaries and rogue states. International opinion surveys today document the deleterious effect on U.S. influence of this rough patch in our foreign policy.

As part of President Bush's second term effort to chart a strategically more lucrative course, U.S. Government national security and defense policy pronouncements in 2006 have taken pains to reassert a fundamental interest in resolving security problems working through friends and allies if possible. It is a message that will require some effort on our part to be taken as more than a rhetorical smoke signal to political and opinion leaders abroad. Part of the proof that this doctrinal course adjustment is genuine will depend on how well the military harvests OEF/OIF coalition lessons-learned and creates a robust, effective planning and coordination architecture for coalition warfighting.

A world where we encourage other peoples, their governments and their armies to believe that we face common dangers and are pursuing a common destiny of security, prosperity and human fulfillment is a world where U.S. forces will be more likely to enjoy sizeable and competent allied help on the battlefield from day one, and where American leadership will again flourish, measured by the one indicator that marks a true leader: followers.

III. Train with AOR partners, but be ready to lead a global force – *There is much benefit to a geographic combatant command building trust and cooperation with militaries in the region. But be prepared for wartime mil-to-mil arrangements that never appeared in a Theater Engagement command briefing.*

Looking back on the planning for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, one wonders if the headquarters staff at CENTCOM ever imagined that they would mount major operations supported by coalitions made up of partner forces from EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM – every regional command except their own.

Leaving aside the issue this raises about the relevance of hard geographic divisions in the Unified Command Plan, the larger point is that countries as distant as Mongolia, New Zealand, Georgia and El Salvador have all identified strategic national interests in committing their forces to operations other than U.N. peacekeeping far from home, braving real dangers while working in close cooperation with U.S. forces.

Even NATO, its decades-long mission of deterring and if necessary repelling a Soviet bloc invasion of western Europe finally accomplished, today regards an out-of-area role – the stabilization of newly-democratic Afghanistan – as its highest operational priority.

It is no stretch of the imagination to envision future operations where large units and interoperable assets cross borders, continents, even hemispheres to join a U.S.-led effort. Command staffs are agile by nature, and showed their talents in effecting liaison and coordination as the coalitions for Afghanistan and Iraq came together. Now it falls to the U.S. military to design mechanisms that will manage a future global coalition most effectively.

If one imagines the view from a foreign capital, it will be clear that our security partner's leadership, legislature, press and public will all be extraordinarily interested to know key facts about a proposed entry to war, to wit: Where are the troops going to operate? How many? With what equipment? Under what command structure? With what mission and ROE? According to what legal basis? For how long? At what budgetary cost? Et cetera.

Consider now that these and other questions could well become a continuous basis for televised commentary and political debate in foreign countries – just as they are today in the United States. Combatant commands will be expected to support high-level, robust interface with all force contributing partners, including a near-real-time flow of releasable information from the battlefield – classified for official use, unclassified for public use. That is how democratic societies will rally to our side and stay with us. It will be worth the investment of effort to get the machinery right; and only the warfighting command can make it work best.

IV. Learn to manage forces with different ROE – *Coalition and host-country forces can play a vital role even if they cannot obtain political consent from their governments to use force as readily as U.S. forces can.*

In the spring of 2004, tensions escalated suddenly in southern Iraq between U.S. forces and the Mahdi militia of the firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr. The Americans acquitted themselves very successfully, dealing the Mahdi serious blows in lopsided encounters. Yet various coalition forces who later claimed to have been caught unaware of the spike in hostilities hunkered down to ride out the firefights rather than engage.

The Joint Staff recognized that several of the coalition force contingents would not be effective in the face of an increased local threat unless they adopted a more aggressive, pro-active posture, and soon. JCS drafted a letter, cleared it internally, and sent it to the Chiefs of Defense of several force contributing countries, somberly advising the CHODs that their contingents required more flexible, offensive ROE, and urging corrective action.

The reaction of some capitals was immediate. One Central American government sent a Cabinet Minister to Washington to explain, more in sorrow than in anger, that a hot war was more than the people had bargained for, and rather than authorize more aggressive ROE, the government would withdraw its forces in an orderly manner. Within 2-3 days, all four Latin American contributors – Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and El Salvador – had informed Washington of decisions to bring their forces home from Iraq. In each case, the increased ROE represented an adjustment they could not make. U.S. forces had to find other ways to assure a stabilizing presence in those areas. Reviewing this episode, one could say that such forces ought not to have been in the coalition in the first place – that notwithstanding their political value in support of OIF, the military value did not justify the effort, and risk, of supporting them in the field.

Calculations of military utility are better left to experts, but it is worth challenging the notion that all members of a coalition must operate from a uniform set of ROE. The ideal of partnering with fully capable, fully interoperable forces with the political authority to fulfill any foreseeable

mission requirement are indeed to be wished for. Energetic peacetime mil-to-mil engagement with friendly countries will improve the prospect of such a wish becoming a reality in a contingency. U.S. forces will be better served, however, if they plan for circumstances where different tiers of ROE are in effect. I offer four examples.

First, in 2002, when U.S. and some advanced coalition forces were engaged in intensive operations against al Qaeda and Taliban on Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, there was an immediate need for stabilization troops in the liberated capital of Kabul. A U.N. resolution authorized an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with far more constrained ROE than the U.S.-led combat force in-country. Command arrangements assured deconfliction, and ISAF performed an extremely valuable mission, operating essentially independently of the U.S. military. Nothing to regret in that example.

Second, in Iraq, as the new Iraqi military is formed and trained with multinational assistance, some units will aspire to a level of operational proficiency where they can conduct aggressive raids and strike targets suspected of housing dangerous elements. Other units, however, will be better left for defensive duties. Success in mentoring a competent Iraqi security sector will include limiting those Iraqi armed forces units with the most aggressive ROE.

Third, if and as Iraq becomes more stable, one can envision localities within the country where conditions are deemed to be secure, even as others remain plagued with extremist violence. In such a setting, it may make sense to dial down the ROE for coalition forces in parts of a country adjudged to have been stabilized, and maintaining crisis-level ROE where needed elsewhere in the country.

Such a geographically tailored de-escalation in U.S./coalition ROE could be a source of political negotiating leverage, as the U.S. and others supporting the political process come to terms with a new sovereign government looking to reclaim management of its security affairs, if only locality by locality.

A fourth example would bring us back to a coalition force where some countries have modest warfighting capability such as the Western Hemisphere states noted above. If they are nevertheless able to assist in, for example, maintaining a security presence at key facilities, why would the U.S. not want that help, knowing that American troops would have to pull that duty otherwise?

V. Embrace the No-Strike List – *Every entry on the list is a location that will hurt our cause if we hit it. Inconvenient, yes; but this tool is aimed at protecting our reputation and minimizing opposition to our use of force.*

How inconvenient it must be for military planners to generate and prioritize target sets and force packages, only to be handed an exhaustive pile of data pinpointing locations they must avoid. How much easier it would be if the adversary's home turf held no such restraints; our forces could focus entirely on disrupting, disabling and if necessary destroying the adversary's ability to threaten us and our interests.

And yet, one dimension of the planning effort for Operation Iraqi Freedom that made the undersigned particularly proud of the United States was the level of effort that went into locating diplomatic, religious, humanitarian, medical, cultural and historical sites throughout Iraq with the intention that they not be harmed. It is hard to imagine that any other country has ever undertaken as advanced and precise a preventive effort as this.

The air operations mounted by the U.S. Air Force and Navy during OIF reflected no less a feat of technological precision. Compared to any previous employment of air power, this was surely the most accurate and controlled in history.

If there is an aspect of the no strike list's role in a combined arms operation that still bears examination after the Iraq experience, it is the level of application of this restraint by U.S. ground forces. After all, with a meticulous, technology-enabled effort taken by pilots, their crews and those directing their air strikes to avoid a large number of precise coordinates, it is reasonable to wonder whether some of the same sites are nevertheless vulnerable to U.S. munitions employed on the ground.

The author can only surmise that Army and Marine forces, while exceptionally professional in their operational art, do not receive the kind of real-time targeting support delivered from ops centers on which air forces routinely rely. What, if any, mechanism exists to help ensure that ground forces do not strike some of the very sites the U.S. has taken such pains not to hit from the air?

Part of the answer may be that these units do concern themselves with the location of mosques, hospitals, and cultural or historic sites. However, ground forces have to react instantaneously to the local threat environment, and simply do not have the kind of data flow that guides aircraft toward the right coordinates and away from the wrong ones. Should they?

If one views the no-strike list as a hindrance in the pursuit of decisive results by ground forces against the enemy, the answer is that these forces ought not be further encumbered with potentially distracting restraints. And if locations, despite being on the no-strike, list have proven to be vulnerable to fire from ground forces, it bears asking what is the point of such elaborate preventive efforts from the air?

The real answer derives from the purpose of this target-avoidance exercise. At one level, it is to save the lives of innocent, neutral, and foreign persons located within the war zone, and to preserve irreplaceable historic and artistic heritage. But a deeper level, the reason this preventive exercise matters to U.S. forces is that failure to take such precautions can lead to criticism as well as loss of local and international support for the U.S. mission.

At a time when popular sentiment is key to achieving military objectives, demonstrable U.S. respect for local culture and heritage matters. For that reason, we will benefit by continuing to improve our military's ability to differentiate the targets we need to destroy from the sites we need to preserve.

VI. All Munitions are Not Equal: American Bombs are Better – *The U.S. is leading the way in cleaning up dangerous live ordnance around the world from wars fought by other armies. When it comes to our own operations, we are setting an example others should follow.*

During the 1990s, at the multilateral arms control talks in Geneva concerning the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States made a promise to the international community. In case of combat operations conducted by U.S. forces, once the hostilities ended, the United States pledged to provide international humanitarian agencies the locations where we had dropped ordnance that could pose lingering hazards to innocents.

Cluster munitions are a prime focus of this arrangement, as many of the bomblets can scatter unexploded. In Afghanistan starting in late 2001, a concern arose over cluster bomblets that allegedly bore similar coloring to humanitarian food packages that had also been delivered by air. This represented a potential danger to children in particular.

The U.S. has lived up to its commitment and provided locations of its cluster bomb strikes to the U.N. and other humanitarian entities clearing post-conflict areas of landmines and other munitions hazards. However, here again, there is a difference between air and ground operations.

After-action reports from OIF in particular show that there is not a uniform appreciation of the post-conflict hazards or related obligations from cluster munitions use across the force. Air operations lend themselves to precise records and data on locations of delivered ordnance. U.S. Marine Corps units moving up the Tigris River to Baghdad in 2003 used cluster munitions sparingly, leaving little if any clean-up concerns. The same cannot, unfortunately, be said for some units of the U.S. Army moving north up the Euphrates River.

The U.S. is the world's most generous source of funds to clear former conflict zones of humanitarian hazards, having spent over $1 Billion in the last decade for demining alone. As a consequence, there is a practical as well as reputation-related national interest in minimizing the burden of post-conflict clean-up. By far the best way to accommodate this interest is for the command to ensure that the entire force understands the post-war risks and obligations that accompany use of cluster munitions.

With cluster bombs as with the even more internationally controversial munition, the landmine, it is appropriate for U.S. forces at all levels of command to weigh factors in addition to the tactical utility of the weapon's unique effects. Their considered judgment may well be to employ the munition. But the national interest will best be served by actions that reflect America's commitments and leadership in helping societies recover from war.

VII. One more headache: tracking VIPs in the fog of war – *Correspondents, politicians and other non-military persons of note can enter a war zone outside the protection of U.S. forces; but when they get in trouble, they cannot be ignored.*

As if our troops did not have enough to worry about while fighting their way to Baghdad to depose the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, or thereafter while on patrol under constant threat of ambush or explosive detonation underfoot, Iraq showed that the modern war zone is open to more than foreign insurgents.

Any civilian who is caught in the crossfire is a concern to our forces in the field as well as to the U.S. Government. Among Iraqi as well as foreign civilians, there have been local workers, foreign contractors, drivers or just visitors captured, brutalized, killed or wounded. Truthfully, some of these civilians, particularly foreign visitor, can be a greater concern – if for example they are famous, well-connected, or both.

The disappearance of one foreign correspondent during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was a transitory news item – one of thousands – during a very busy phase of operations. In the outside civilian world, however, the visibility of this episode grew, as the family of the correspondent enjoyed the sympathetic help of important news organizations. Questions about the precise time, location and circumstances of the incident were raised at high-level press conferences as senior U.S. officials conducted diplomacy in allied capitals.

When a correspondent unattached to U.S. forces goes missing on the battlefield, it is a near-certainty that reasonably well-connected and well-informed persons independent of official channels will collect information and piece together any leads that may help resolve the fate of the victim. They may build public and international pressure for the U.S. Government to produce any information to which it may have access.

During Iraqi Freedom, this meant that Washington officials were asked by foreign counterparts to query specific small units of the U.S. military still engaged in the operation about exactly what they saw and what they knew. The requests were passed on informally from Washington down to command representatives in theater. All recognized, however, that there is no established process for contacting soldiers on the battlefield in the midst of complex operations about matters of diplomatic and humanitarian interest but not warfighting, intelligence or criminal investigative import.

Such a request would be anything but easy to accommodate. To try and probe for information from deployed forces about events days or weeks earlier that may not have directly involved them, is not the kind of burden one would wish on our troops.

And yet, kidnappings and unexplained disappearances will happen. VIPs will get into adverse situations. One hates to contemplate a Member of Congress falling into enemy hands, but the fact is that many Members travel to war zones against the advice of the executive branch by affiliating with non-governmental organizations and characterizing their travel as private rather than official.

The lesson for future contingencies is that all troops need to recognize this element of modern warfare where the global media environment impacts our national interests. Soldiers should be ready to report their observations when they see civilian cars or hotels coming under enemy fire.

Collateral damage will happen when forces fight in built up areas and on well-traveled roads; but unfortunately they may not always be able to put it out of mind and move on.

VIII. Money: don't leave home without it – *Military forces helping to stabilize a war zone need cash and the authority to use it in assisting and winning over the local population. It is an essential tool on today's battlefield, and it needs to be managed better.*

There is a long and unhappy history surrounding the issue of whether people working overseas on behalf of the U.S. Government should be trusted with carrying and disbursing cash funds, particularly at their own discretion. The U.S. Agency for International Development, whose effectiveness depends in part on the perception by host country people that it can truly improve their lives, has long struggled to gain as much discretion as possible in the field with usable assistance funds.

It has been mostly an uphill battle, as a few bad eggs over the years have purloined funds for their personal use, causing the agency leadership and Congress to impose tight reins on expenditure of appropriated funds. Today, U.S. Ambassadors posted around the world have modest discretionary spending authority to respond to a clear emergency in the host nation. Few others serving within our embassies can expend funds without formal Washington approval.

OEF and OIF were textbook examples of liberated countries many of whose people had critical needs after the fall of the regimes that had repressed them. In both cases, U.S. soldiers were the first American faces the locals encountered, and both soldier and local citizen alike shared a recognition that basic human needs had to be addressed if possible. There are, by now, countless stories of U.S. troops doing all they can to help Afghan and Iraqi people in desperate need.

The Iraq campaign in particular broke through the old taboos regarding discretion to disburse funds. U.S. forces had the benefit of Iraqi cash recovered from Saddam loyalists trying to flee the country, as well as some Iraqi oil revenues supplied by the interim Iraqi authorities prior to the election of a fully constitutional government in early 2006. These funds undoubtedly facilitated the military mission in countless ways, and reinforced a local perception that the Americans were there to help – a crucial factor in the counter-insurgency effort.

However, the Iraq stabilization immediately effort following the fall of Saddam, in which soldiers could use their own judgment and dispense cash without prior senior-level approval, represented such a departure from the strict and process-bound bureaucratic norm that Washington is highly unlikely to be so permissive in a future operation.

Under the Coalition Provisional Authority's leadership, U.S. Government representatives dispensed some $12 billion in Iraqi funds for which, an investigation subsequently showed, there was no accounting. Congress and the President's Office of Management and Budget, while certainly understanding the exigencies of operating in a dangerous environment, need more than a "sorry, war is hell" excuse if military forces are to be handling and disbursing funds in the future.

There are, accordingly, two take-aways from OIF in this area. One, money really must be a tool for U.S. forces operating in any kind of future operation other than a kinetic head-to-head contest with an enemy force in a remote, unpopulated battlespace. The second is that DoD and the services will need to develop some kind of accounting process for funds disbursed in the field.

This latter requirement should not require much effort by combat units preoccupied with a dangerous mission. But in the future, the force should be equipped with a small, ruggedized piece of information technology into which a unit can make simple entries for sums of money disbursed each day, with the ability later to transmit or download the data to a headquarters database, all in a common format approved by OMB. DoD should anticipate this requirement and present OMB and congressional oversight committees a comprehensive solution.

At the same time, combatant commands should review other OEF-OIF budgetary lessons learned and seek to put in place funding authority mechanisms for the next time.

One example is the ability to finance pre-conflict infrastructure improvements in-theater in preparation for potential large-scale force deployments. These are not foreign assistance, strictly speaking, since the U.S. needs them more than the host country. Yet, they can be valuable for the host country military over the longer-term; the promise to finance such improvements can be an inducement to a host country to permit more robust overflight, landing and bed-down access relative to the crisis.

A second example is a host country of limited financial means whose military forces perform vital support roles as U.S. and coalition forces conduct their combat mission. It is understandable that the host country would ask for reimbursement, and that the combatant commander would very much want Washington to agree. This can add up to substantial sums, well in excess of what might be scraped away from other dedicated foreign military financing or peacekeeping operations assistance accounts.
Each of the preceding examples is taken from the recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. None had the benefit of existing process, standing authorities, or dedicated budget support. All turned out to be significant headaches for senior sub-cabinet officials in Washington agencies as well as staff and Members in Congress, ever striving to account for the public's funds in full compliance with the law.

Unless commanders are prepared to face future crises without assurance that funds will be available to cover critical needs that arise in-theater, they would do well to engage their civilian colleagues and put new authorities in place.

IX. Communications: not just a tactical concern anymore – *The relevance of communications to prosecuting a war against violent extremism is hard to overstate. It must be elevated in importance as an issue for planners and senior policy officials alike.*

A traditional approach to a military campaign would reflect a civilian-military division of labor in the realm of communications. The military would seek to import robust command and control to the battlespace while exploiting, disrupting and denying enemy communications. Elements of

the military effort might include leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts, and psychological operations to demoralize the adversary and win popular cooperation with our efforts.

Civilian leadership and agencies, meanwhile, would arrange assistance programs to rebuild telecommunications systems, establish local broadcast capabilities, facilitate expansion of telephone service, possibly create specialized programming to be broadcast into the country being contested, and – importantly – articulate most of the U.S. policy views regarding the crisis carried on local, regional and global media.

And yet, who would deny that when Saddam Hussein's statue fell in Baghdad, the U.S. owned the skies, and had a monopoly of political power as it (literally) ran the Iraqi state, and yet it manifestly did not own the airwaves? Two Arabic language television stations broadcasting into Iraq from Iranian soil, not to mention established regional satellite Arab media including Aljazeera, MBC and Al Arabiya, dominated the Iraqi TV airwaves for months on end before the U.S. could muster a serious presence on the Iraqi media.

A second example is telephony. The Multinational Force in Iraq gains vital eyewitness intelligence on dangerous actors through the Iraqi National Tips Line. And yet, one hears that in many Sunni towns of Iraq's Al Anbar province, where extremists hide and prepare attacks against our forces and Iraqi citizens, many people lack telephones or at least working telephone service, hence are unable to phone in these tips quickly and anonymously from the vantage point of their homes.

Whether Pentagon or non-defense agencies have primary responsibility for reconstituting television broadcasting and telephone service in Iraq, would it not make sense for U.S. commanders to treat these elements of the host-country communications sector as vitally relevant to their ability to succeed?

One might not have thought so in the last century, when states more commonly fought over territorial issues. In a conflict where our strategic goal is to extinguish extremist incitement among many tens of millions of young men across several time zones, it has become necessary to seek a position of dominance not only with respect to contested territory, but also with respect to the media of communication that, largely uncontested, can give psychological succor to the enemy and can turn physical victories into perceived defeats.

This is not to argue that these sectors and tasks should be assigned to the military. It is to argue that all agencies concerned with communications should be in full coordination with military planners well before an operation commences, and thereafter. This is an area ripe for significant new thinking.

X. <u>How much of this mission is military, anyway</u>? – *A war where our enemies are not, by20th century standards, military forces, or for that matter, sovereign states, raises questions about the effectiveness of military capabilities in defending against and defeating them. There are areas of relevant expertise and competence outside of the defense establishment that must be pulled to the forefront of the national effort.*

Part I of this essay explored the psychological dimension of the war against al Qaeda sympathizers and Saddam loyalists, emphasizing that until such time as the other side believes it is losing, we may be frustrated that military and civil tasks accomplished by our hand do not lead to an end to the conflict and its ever-present dangers.

For decades the Department of Defense has sought to ensure that soldiers in the field have the support of all kinds of competencies to include intelligence, linguistic support, global diplomatic support, PSYOPS and information operations as well as regular public diplomacy by the department's leadership. All of these are resident within the Office of the Secretary of Defense or associated Defense agencies, if not the military itself.

As the nature of America's terrorist adversaries has shifted away from the traditional form of standing organizations with weapons systems to an entirely non-traditional form of dispersed, transnational, secretive operatives living as civilians, and rallying support through guerrilla propaganda aired in the mass media, the question arises as to whether DoD is still able to bring forward the necessary tools to defeat this threat on all levels.

Perhaps the best test case is the formal occupation phase in Iraq, from mid-2003 to mid-2004, when the Coalition Provisional Authority ran the country, reporting back to Washington solely through the Secretary of Defense. A fair history of that experience should probably record an overwhelmingly greater quotient of courageous, selfless acts by Americans seeking to help Iraq become viable post-Saddam than the problems and criticisms that inevitably gain the most attention.

However, few could dispute that there were gaps in the national effort, not all caused by the onerous security restrictions on foreign workers in the Green Zone. Early post-mortems of the Iraq stabilization effort focus on existing capabilities in the State Department and other non-defense agencies that could profitably have been brought to bear had the President made a different delegation of interagency responsibility.

Without trying to claim who could have done what differently or better, the point here is that the U.S. should be radically reassessing its tool kit across the interagency spectrum. Even though the State Department is developing a post-conflict and stabilization capability, it will amount only to a handful of senior planners with a mountain of well-organized data. We should consider building a civilian army of willing, deployable regional experts with associated transport, communications, protection, and funds to do some of the job that our forces have ended up doing.

As the intelligence community undergoes transformational reform under the recently-established Director of National Intelligence, its primary focus at that level appears to be inside-the-Beltway concerns – setting priorities amongst the component agencies, streamlining process, enhancing information-sharing, and assuring that the President is receiving the information he needs daily.

These are important and necessary. One hopes, however, that the reformist impulse will carry over to real-time operational activity in coordination with military operations worldwide. The

same can be said for law enforcement operations relating to extremist activities, and public affairs offices throughout the national security community. We need to 'up our game' at the national level.

The U.S. military has, for years, taken an increasingly urgent interest in better mutual coordination and support from non-defense agencies. Combatant commands, already advised at the top level by a State Department Political Advisor, or POLAD, most of Ambassadorial rank, now host representatives of several civilian agencies on their staffs. Each of these groups, known as a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), adds knowledge, perspective, advice and contacts that can benefit the command's planning process.

A JIACG is not, however, a substitute for muscular, agile, well-resourced global capabilities that can synchronize each department's activities and public statements toward the singular goal of defeating – in spirit and perception as well as physically – the extremist challenge we now face.

A proper effort to achieve full-spectrum operational capability – civilian and military – at the national level means that Congress must be a full participant in the conversation with the Executive Branch. Only when both branches are prepared to put their organization and oversight patterns, resource levels, and allocation of authorities on the table can the U.S. hope to achieve a transformational national security reform worthy of the name.

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