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TURKEY AND U.S. SECURITY:  
BETWEEN NATO AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

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The year 1981 signals a turning point for the United States, both in its assessment of the threats to Western security and in its self-appointed role in countering those threats. From an American perspective, the bloom of detente has disappeared from East-West relations. America's strategic retreat of the 1970s has given way to a resurgent sense of responsibility for ensuring global stability by deterring would-be aggressors. Preoccupation with the danger of a major war in central Europe has partially shifted to a new focus on contingencies involving small groups of terrorist insurgents threatening the stability of Persian Gulf regimes. The very notion of "security" has come to mean much more than military capability, as the fear of oil disruptions has heightened our appreciation of the linkage between economic health and political strength.

As the United States undertakes to build up the Rapid Deployment Force, and to prepare facilities in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf which will facilitate American power projection later in the 1980s, the role of Turkey assumes a special importance. Militarily, the large Turkish army (of over half a million) stands as an impressive potential buffer against a southward lunge by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops through NATO's southeastern flank. Logistically, Turkish military installations hold out the possibility of a very convenient transit point for American airlift operations should U.S. forces be sent in to the Middle East in a crisis. Politically, the Turks' unique national personality, which finds a Middle Eastern people subscribing

to European models of government, makes them a valuable intermediary between the Western and Middle Eastern worlds from whose traditions they have variously drawn.

The resumption of an activist geopolitical role by the United States has prompted some negativistic comparisons of the 1980s to the 1950s, as if to suggest that because the balance of military power today is so much less favorable to the United States than it was twenty-five years ago, any new attempts to "deal from strength" can only meet with frustration and failure. Far from laboring under simplistic and misguided illusions, however, the architects and proponents of a more assertive and militarily credible posture are well aware that the success of American efforts to reinforce stability in the Middle East and elsewhere will depend critically on the way in which U.S. policies are tailored to suit the new realities of the 1980s.

Experience has shown the United States the costs of taking on military commitments it is either unwilling or unable to successfully fulfill; the dangers of assuming that the most cooperative client regimes enjoy unshakeable tenure within their countries; the transcendent importance of popular perceptions in those countries regarding the intentions and ideological values of each of the superpowers; and the imprudence of misinterpreting discrete areas of U.S.-Soviet cooperation as an indication of a historical alteration in the goals and operative nature of the Soviet state. It is quite true that the Soviet Union is once again seen by Washington to be the primary source

of Western insecurity; but unlike the 1950s, the solutions fashioned by American leaders--particularly in the Middle East--must rely much more on cultural sensitivity, diplomatic tact, informal understandings, and adaptability to the currents of regional political change than on military capability alone.

Turkey is a key actor in the global East-West relationship, both as a major contributor to NATO's defense of Europe and as a full participant in the institutional groupings of the Islamic countries. Beyond these concrete affiliations and the opportunities and constraints which they imply, Turkey offers an interesting example--in many ways, a paradigm--of the profound and irreversible impact of the 1960s and 1970s on the social, economic, and ultimately, political complexion of most if not all of the countries in and around the Middle East. In a similar vein, it provides a clear warning of the pitfalls attending any American effort to reconstruct relations with this valuable ally which fails to recognize these important changes.

It may appear in 1981 that Turkey, by virtue of the present leadership of the military commanders in Ankara, has "returned to the fold," so to speak, of a firm commitment to Western security, coupled with a renewed effort to realize Kemal Ataturk's dream of making Turkey into a modern, European state. Listening to the reassuring statements of junta leader Gen. Kenan Evren and his associates, one is tempted to forget that a mere two years ago, Western analysts were routinely decrying Turkey's neutralism in the East-West context and even her acute susceptibility to the

spread of Islamic revolutionary fervor from neighboring Iran.

Have these ominous developments truly disappeared without a trace, or are they lurking just beneath the surface while the military leaders restore law and order to this violence-ravaged country? The answer is not readily discernible. The political character of the Turkish Republic in the 1980s will be shaped by a combination of internal and external factors; and the three 'power blocs' which have actively courted Turkish political cooperation since World War II--the NATO countries, the Soviet bloc, and most recently, the Islamic countries--will be competing for 45 million Turkish hearts and minds. That being the case, the first requirement for American policy-makers is to grasp the domestic significance of last September's military takeover in Ankara--the third such army intervention in twenty years. An appreciation of Turkey's stormy experiment with democracy goes far to explain the recent confusion in Ankara's foreign policy.

from Ataturk to anarchy in two generations

For centuries in Anatolia the armed forces have been looked to as the ruling 'caste' among Turks; in the twentieth century, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's heroic leadership of the post-World War I Turkish nationalist movement, his ascension to the presidency of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, and the leading role performed by him and his "Kemalist" army followers in shaping and guiding the young republic since then have perpetuated the social pre-eminence of the military in Turkey. Moreover, unlike the European

states whose democratic traditions it imitates, Turkey's political parties have developed as a result of the competition between elites rather than through a natural organizing process within mass-based social or ethnic groupings. Turkish democracy is therefore quite unique in substance, if not in style.

In the process of saving Ottoman Turkey from dismemberment at the hands of European allied victors, Kemal Ataturk and his associates outmaneuvered several other Turkish interest groups vying for a share of influence within the nationalist movement. These included the so-called Young Turks, many of whom sought a reconstitution of the Ottoman Empire following two centuries of retrenchment; European-influenced liberal social reformers; Kurdish and Armenian minorities in eastern Anatolia, seeking autonomy and perhaps nationhood; Islamic leaders, whose goal of liberating Turks from the enemy of "Christian" Europe was openly endorsed by Kemal Ataturk himself in the early stages of the nationalist movement; landed aristocrats, hoping to expand their wealth and influence; and other such elements.

By the time the Turkish Republic was born in 1923, the leading elites had crystallized into two broad factions, which Frederick W. Frey has termed the "ardent nationalists" and the "postindependence conservatives."<sup>1</sup> Whereas the former, led by Kemal Ataturk, were primarily interested in building up Turkey's strength vis-à-vis the more developed countries which had been imposing their wills on Turkey for so long, the latter's primary concern was to enact constitutional protection of the rights of the individual. Both

groups counted strong support among the military veterans of the independence struggle.

President Kemal, as is well known, proceeded to concentrate a great deal of power in the hands of the state; when the "laissez-faire" civil libertarian army faction formed the Progressive Party in 1925 to oppose his activist governance, he managed to have the party closed down through extra-constitutional measures. In 1927 Kemal enacted a law removing the army from politics completely.

Scholars differ over whether the harsh and dictatorial measures taken by Kemal Ataturk in the latter part of the 1920s were a necessary precondition for a unified Turkish democratic system after one hundred years of dissension, or an overzealous and excessive intrusion on the lives of Anatolia's peoples which sowed the seeds of revolt a generation hence. Either way, when we consider the prospects for stability in Turkey in the 1980s following what is likely to be a one- to two-year effort to "return the country to Kemalist principles" on the part of the army commanders, it is worth recalling that twenty-two years of radical nation-building by the Kemalists (the last seven under the leadership of Ataturk's colleague Ismet Inonu following Ataturk's death in 1938) did not eliminate any of the aforementioned groups whose interests were suppressed during the Republican People's Party's lengthy reign.

In fact, all of these "skeletons" came roaring out of the "closet" after the May 1946 Electoral Law introduced direct

universal suffrage, secret balloting and the legalization of political parties. In the 1950 election, an opposition party, the Democratic Party--combining laissez-faire conservatives, business entrepreneurs and advocates of Islamic free expression--won 408 of 450 National Assembly seats, as nearly 90 percent of eligible Turkish voters turned out to make known their desire for change.

This widespread political reawakening took place at a time of great social change as well. During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, industrialization was changing the traditional patterns of village life, while roads and radios were reaching backward peoples in rural Anatolia for the first time. As much as any factor, modernization can be credited with inducing changes in Turkey which have led to enormous social tensions in the past fifteen years and served to alter the role of the army, by undermining the relevance and legitimacy of Ataturk's political blueprint for the country while at the same time making the military Turkey's gendarmerie of last resort.

After the ruling Democratic Party borrowed too much from Ataturk's own autocratic example in its effort to enhance its political survivability during the late 1950s, the army suspended the government, dissolved the Democratic Party, hanged its leader, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and undertook to draft a new constitution while governing the country for eighteen months in 1960-61. The 1961 Constitution, drafted under the direction of the army commanders, was designed to prevent the kind of

abuses of government power which had taken place in the 1950s. Its wide-ranging guarantees of individual freedoms from government intrusion marked a radical reversal from the early period of Ataturk's "benevolent dictatorship"--an ironic reversal, some would say, since Ataturk's authoritarianism and the 1961 Constitution's anti-authoritarianism were both designed largely to forestall a deterioration of the Kemalists' position of influence in Turkish politics.

It is clear, in retrospect, that the combination of rapid social change and sudden freedoms of expression and organization in the 1960s brought about the divisiveness and rampant political violence which exploded in the universities of Turkey beginning in 1968. It is also likely that the absence of powerful leaders --in a culture which thrives on leadership--and the growing popular legitimacy of numerous alternative political viewpoints to those of Ataturk, contributed to the psychological alienation of Turkey's youth, thereby enhancing the attractiveness to them of extreme ideologies, both revolutionary and fascist. In March 1971, it became necessary once again for the armed forces to suspend the government and restore order to the country. In contrast to 1960, however, this time the army waited for thirty months before entrusting the government once again to civilians.

Due to this lengthy hiatus in political activity, Turkey's two major centrist political parties (the moderate-right Justice Party and the moderate-left Republican People's Party) suffered considerable erosion of mass electoral support. The army's

cautious approach toward a resumption of constitutional activity thus had two unintended consequences: first, all six of the political parties competing in the October 1973 election were so weakened and intimidated that not only did no single party win a majority, but no agreement was reached among the parties on a ruling coalition for over three months, and not until April 1975 did a reasonably stable coalition run the government; and second, with the centrist parties thus diminished, immoderate splinter parties came to exert influence far beyond their electoral strength by making their coalition support contingent upon control over key ministries and policy areas. In this way, the Islamic activist Necmettin Erbakan (National Salvation Party) and the extreme right-wing leader Alparslan Turkes (Nationalist Action Party) gained visibility and prominence in the 1970s.

Unwieldy coalitions and fragile governing majorities translated into inconsistent policies and a lack of clear direction in Turkey throughout the 1970s. As the economy deteriorated due to the skyrocketing national bill for imported oil as well as the massive influx of unskilled and unemployable rural Turks to the shantytowns skirting the major cities of western Turkey, the cacaphony of political voices emanating from Ankara gave the public little comfort and even less confidence. Newspaper readers the world over are aware of the epidemic of organized political violence which raged in Turkey through the end of the 1970s. Two decades of ineffective leadership had left the country in a shambles.

Now the army has stepped in a third time, arguably under more dire circumstances than surrounded the 1960 and 1971 interventions. Since the September 1980 takeover, Gen. Evren and his junta have effectively quelled the violence--but at what price? All politicians have been forced into permanent retirement; the press has operated under "self-censorship"; and tens of thousands of activists have been arrested and charged with various offenses against the state. As the military commanders drive interest groups of every stripe into the woodwork, as it were, all in the name of "safeguarding Ataturk's principles," might they not be repeating the same mistake made by Ataturk himself in the 1920s and 1930s? Is it realistic to expect the voices of Kurdish separatists, disillusioned leftist anti-"imperialists", pan-Turkic ultra-conservatives and Islamic purists to remain forever stilled? The post-World War II experience would suggest that the answer is no, regardless of whether democratic freedoms are suspended for two years or twenty years.

#### Reagan and Evren: Together--A New Beginning?

This situation raises some very challenging questions for American policy-makers. Chance and circumstance have placed conservative, like-minded and mutually well-disposed government leaders in power in both Washington and Ankara at a time when U.S.-Turkish fence-mending is both needed and long overdue. There would seem to be an overwhelming temptation for the United States not to question its good fortune in having NATO's southern

flank suddenly repaired (it was the lifting of Turkey's veto by the junta which enabled Greece to rejoin NATO's military structure last fall) at a time of heightened East-West tensions. For geopolitically-conservative Americans and Europeans, Gen. Evren and the Kemalists are clearly "our boys" in Turkey as compared with any other prospective governing group in the Turkish political arena.

The junta, however, will probably not be setting Turkish policy for long. By October 29 of this year, an assembly is to have been formed to write a new constitution. Once the "purification" of Turkey's democratic system is deemed by the generals to have been completed, a fresh attempt at multiparty democracy will be initiated. In contrast to the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 version is expected to restore greater authority to the government in power. Proportional representation to the National Assembly will likely be abandoned in favor of a new formula which restricts minority party influence. Once again, looking at recent experience one is tempted to ask whether this augurs a return to the authoritarianism--and the constraints on individual freedom, opening the way for abuses of power--which spelled disaster in the late 1950s. It is sad but true that in terms of democratic experimentation, Turkey has tried almost everything, and nothing yet has worked for very long.

Having suffered such severe social and economic tribulations and survived to try democracy yet again, however, Turks have reason to feel hopeful about their future, where a healthier

economy and a reduced level of polarization in the parliament and the universities might restore the public's faith in the system--and, by extension, in the father of that system, Kemal Ataturk. If so, the army will have greatly elevated its prestige, and the United States will find itself in an excellent position to recapture the goodwill it once enjoyed in the Turkish populace. If, on the other hand, the resumption of civilian rule and the lifting of martial law measures leads to a period of timid and uncertain leadership and inconsistent policy--as happened the last time around, in October 1973--the United States will not be able to ride the Kemalists' coattails back into the hearts of Turkey's citizenry.

It is even conceivable, although not expected, that the junta will not loosen its grip on the social order for quite some time, either due to a reluctance to relinquish control over government policy, or perhaps to some recurrence of extremist activity following the initial reintroduction of civilian rule. If the army commanders were to overextend their public mandate in the coming months and years, the United States would risk alienating Turkish public opinion further than it already has if it were closely identified with the junta in the people's eyes. (It was America's unabashed support of the right-wing Greek colonels who staged a coup in Athens in 1967 and maintained a military dictatorship until July 1974 which has poisoned U.S.-Greek relations ever since then.)

The prescription implied here for Washington is simple.

The Kemalists deserve our help and good wishes in their campaign to stabilize and improve their political system and economy; in setting a long-term course for American-Turkish cooperation, however, U.S. policy-makers must focus on the sub-currents of public opinion in Turkey which have been developing for two decades or more. The voices of disillusionment over Turkey's Western ties may have been stilled by the army since September 1980; but the attitudes remain among Turkish journalists and academics. This is as good a time as any for Americans to examine just what has taken place since the 1950s to make the Turks suspicious of our motives and resentful of our power.

the curse of geopolitics: between a rock and a hard place

Simple-minded though it may seem to some who have followed the intricacies of Turkish foreign policy over the years, it is nevertheless instructive to view the broad outlines of Turkey's post-World War II relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union in tandem, for there is a clearly discernible relationship between the two. Historically, of course, Russian expansionist designs against Ottoman Turkish territory resulted in no fewer than thirteen wars between these two neighbors. It would probably require two or three generations of imperial abstinence on Moscow's part to diminish the Turks' deeply-embedded mistrust of Russian motives. Any illusions Lenin may have had of initiating this confidence-rebuilding process in 1921, when his revolutionary new Bolshevik regime

signed a treaty of friendship with Kemal Ataturk's pre-independence nationalists, were demonstrably not valued or shared by Stalin in subsequent years; similarly, the progress made by both Khrushchev and Brezhnev in fostering greater trust among the Turks was profoundly set back by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a country whose Tatar peoples share some common ethnic bonds with Anatolia's Turks.

Russian "imperialism", therefore, is a notion which still reverberates powerfully in modern Turkey, as it did in centuries past. Turkish antipathies toward the United States, by contrast, are a very recent phenomenon indeed, with roots stretching back scarcely two decades. After World War I, it was President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points which fed the idealism of the Turkish nationalists seeking self-determination. At the conclusion of World War II, when Stalin consummated a "war of nerves" against Ankara by demanding that Turkey cede to the U.S.S.R. the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan and that it relinquish a share of its internationally-recognized sovereign control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it was the United States which came to represent the hope of salvation from Russian bullying when the U.S. battleship Missouri paid a courtesy visit to Istanbul in the spring of 1946.

Moscow's reassertion of its historic expansionist aims against Turkey and Britain's postwar strategic retreat from the Middle East and Near East coincided to create the basis for a solid new alliance of the United States and Turkey. From

the initiation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 through much of the 1950s, American-Turkish relations were very friendly and very close. Turkey enhanced its stature in Western circles by serving on the U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission at the end of the 1940s, by sending combat troops to fight alongside Americans in Korea in 1950, and by joining NATO in 1952. The June 1954 Military Facilities Agreement between Washington and Ankara provided for the construction of the very bases (such as the major airbase at Incirlik) whose possible use by American forces is the subject of such controversy today.

What happened to the U.S.-Turkish alliance? Where did it turn sour? It is in considering this question that it is particularly instructive to look at Turkey's relations with both the Americans and the Soviets as an overall process. After all, Turkey's whole-hearted embrace of the American security umbrella during the Cold War--including the stationing of Jupiter nuclear missiles on Turkish soil--was a direct by-product of its fear of Soviet aggression. With the Kremlin's renunciation of Stalin's postwar claims on Turkey in May 1953, barely two months after the announcement of his death, it became clear that the Soviets were intent upon defusing this fear and recapturing a measure of the goodwill which they had once enjoyed with Kemal Ataturk.

In this endeavor Moscow profited immensely from a series of American actions which undermined Turkish popular support for Ankara's exclusively pro-West, anti-Soviet alignment. The

first of these occurred in 1958, when the U.S. staged the landing of Marines in Lebanon from Turkish bases without giving the Turkish government any prior notification. The next was in May 1960, when American pilot Francis Gary Powers, flying out of Turkey, had his U-2 plane shot down over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union. Since the Turks were not active participants in the American intelligence-gathering operation in Turkey, they were more than a little disenchanted with the stern public rebuke directed at them by Moscow.

Twenty-six days after the U-2 incident, when the army suspended the Menderes government in Turkey, the Soviet Union acted quickly to capitalize on the strain in Turkish-American relations by immediately recognizing the army's interim Committee of National Unity. In a note to Turkish Prime Minister Gen. Cemal Gursel, Khrushchev said: (I)t is our deep conviction that the most sincere relations between our two neighbor countries would develop if Turkey embarked upon the road of neutrality."<sup>2</sup>

In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy's assurances to Khrushchev that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed further weakened the Turkish-American alliance. Not only were the Turks outraged that their security umbrella should be treated by the U.S. as a dispensable bargaining chip in the global strategic contest; but to many Turks, the removal of the missiles lessened the likelihood (and hence the fear) that the Soviets would contemplate nuclear strikes against Turkey. In May 1963, just three weeks after Kennedy's pledge,

the Kremlin extended, and Ankara accepted, an invitation for the first official Turkish parliamentary visit ever to the Soviet Union.

If a seminal event can be identified in the process of Turkish-American estrangement, it is the June 5, 1964 letter from U.S. President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, urging him to refrain from intervening militarily on Cyprus to quell the post-independence intercommunal strife. The "Johnson letter" (as it has since been called) forestalled the Turkish action with the unsettling admonition that, "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies." Faced with the alternative of jeopardizing alliance protection, the Turks had to back down on Cyprus, despite what they saw as a legal (Annex I, Article 2 of the 1959 London Agreement) and legitimate pretext to intervene on behalf of the beleaguered Cypriot Turkish minority.

The Johnson letter humiliated a proud people, and made the Turkish army publicly appear to have been manipulated from afar by a self-interested great power--precisely the kind of Ottoman nightmare which Kemal Ataturk's heroics were supposed to have rendered unrepeatabe. It was "a rite of passage," writes a congressional analyst, "for Turks to learn that the intense emotionalism they felt towards Americans in the fifties was not

reciprocated."<sup>3</sup> From this point on, escalating Turkish concern over Cyprus--by now the number one foreign policy issue in Turkey--drove a wedge between Washington and Ankara, since the American 'connection' was seen as an obstruction in the Turks' handling of their primary security problem.

Well-intentioned though American peacekeeping efforts toward Cyprus may have been, they were counterproductive. In November 1967, when it again appeared that Turkey might intervene militarily on Cyprus to prevent a Greek-led right-wing coup there, President Johnson was again compelled to urge restraint, and he sent Cyrus Vance as a special negotiator to help defuse the crisis. In July 1974, when Archbishop Makarios was overthrown by a cabal of right-wing officers favoring enosis (unification of Cyprus and Greece), Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit went ahead with a full-scale military invasion, telling U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco, "We have done it your way for ten years. Now we are going to try it our way."<sup>4</sup>

Having committed itself to a long-standing policy of conflict-avoidance on Cyprus, the United States now found, to its embarrassment (particularly in the eyes of Greeks), that pushing the Turks had backfired; so it punished them. The U.S. Congress enacted an arms embargo against Turkey in February 1975 which, although slightly lifted that October, lasted more than three years, until October 1978. Predictably--or so one would have thought--the Turks responded in kind by abrogating all military arrangements with the United States and by halting the activities of most of

the 26 American-staffed bases in Turkey. The Turkish military command stopped providing routine readiness reports to NATO, and later declared that Turkey could not fulfill its goals under the NATO Long Term Defense Program. In ten years the U.S.-Turkish security bond had deteriorated from estrangement to separation, and by the late 1970s it was headed for divorce.

Was the simultaneous furtherance of Turkish-Soviet relations an unrelated coincidence? The answer is no. In 1964, immediately after the Johnson letter, the Soviets changed their position on the Cyprus issue from pro-Greek to neutral; soon thereafter, they suspended clandestine arms shipments to the Greek Cypriots. When Prime Minister Suat Hayri Urguplu visited the U.S.S.R. in August 1965--the first Turkish head of state to do so officially--the Soviets declared opposition to enosis and pledged technical assistance to improve Cypriot Turkish living standards.<sup>5</sup> Repeating a standard Soviet diplomatic pattern which had brought the Kremlin success in the 1930s with Kemal Ataturk--a pattern in which initial diplomatic contacts are followed by symbolic high-level contacts, then by a dramatic outpouring of Soviet economic largesse, and ultimately by gentle but firm pressure for "cooperation in the political sphere"--Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin created yet another diplomatic precedent by visiting Turkey in December 1966. Three months later a major Turkish-Soviet economic agreement was announced, providing for Soviet assistance in large-scale industrial and infrastructural projects throughout Turkey.

The political reward to Moscow was forthcoming in May 1972,

when Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visited Ankara and came away with a signed "Declaration of the Principles of Good-Neighborly Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey." If Americans found little reason for concern in 1972 as the spirit of detente warmed the atmosphere of East-West relations, they came to appreciate the document's significance in 1979, when the crucial issue of SALT verification ran headlong into the 1972 Turkish-Soviet mutual pledge to abide by "the non-use of force or the threat of force and refusal to allow their territories to be used for staging aggression and subversive actions against other states." For a while it appeared that American U-2 flights out of Turkey would continue only if Moscow consented. In subtle but significant ways, the Russians' diplomacy was succeeding in neutralizing their southern neighbor by capitalizing on the failures of American diplomacy.

Two comments are pertinent here. First of all, to the degree that Turkey's intense Cold War paranoia had caused it to substitute emotion for common sense in making foreign policy during the 1950s, the 1960s Turkish-Soviet thaw was both inevitable and in some ways even salutary for Turkey, as it afforded a more sober and thus mature appraisal of the Turkish national interest. Secondly, however, it must not be overlooked that after the very liberal 1961 Constitution came into force in Turkey, proponents of leftist ideologies were given a virtual free hand to organize, recruit sympathizers, and agitate against the United States and any Turkish politicians whose views were identified with Washington

(such as support for the rising American involvement in Vietnam). Because opportunities for education and employment were hopelessly insufficient to accommodate the flood of migrants to the urban shantytowns and the burgeoning population generally (the annual growth rate was and still is roughly 2.5 percent), anti-capitalist and anti-Western sentiments flourished unchecked in the very permissive social milieu of the 1960s. As the 1970s bloodily demonstrated, this was most assuredly not salutary.

A third parenthetical point, the comprehension of which by all parties involved hasn't made matters any easier between them, is that since U.S. President Truman's historic containment speech of March 12, 1947, American policy has been to support the independence and economic integrity of both Greece and Turkey. This obligation has been the basis for cooperation when interests have converged, as with NATO; it has likewise been the basis for dissension when interests have diverged, as with Cyprus. Because the U.S. felt that its relationship with Greece would be unacceptably jeopardized if American weapons were used in a Turkish invasion of Cyprus without an ounce of prevention or protest from Washington, the United States forfeited the trust and goodwill of Turkey's army and citizenry; because the U.S. nevertheless failed to prevent such an invasion, the people of Greece blamed the United States anyway.

Throughout all of this, no party understood the dynamics of the process more than the Soviets who, by continually stepping-up their diplomatic and propaganda efforts in Greece and Turkey,

rather effortlessly played both sides against the 'middle' (i.e., the U.S. and NATO). In November 1975--ten months after the American embargo was initiated against Turkey, and merely one month after the U.S. Congress tried to mitigate the political damage by partially "lifting" it--the Soviet Union sold sixty military helicopters to Turkey,<sup>6</sup> thereby reaching another security milestone with a NATO country. In December 1975 Aleksei Kosygin came again to Turkey, and the two governments agreed to draw up a second political document. At the 25th Party Congress in Moscow in 1976, Chairman Brezhnev claimed that Soviet-Turkish ties were expanding "from the sphere of chiefly economic to political questions."<sup>7</sup> He was right.

Furthermore, this political cooperation was generating tangible rewards for the Soviet Union in the security sphere. In keeping with the historical Russian goal of obtaining unimpeded naval access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets finally succeeded in emasculating the 1936 Montreux Convention governing the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) when the Soviet light aircraft carrier Kiev steamed through the Straits on July 18, 1976. Article 14 and Section B of Annex 2, specifying tonnage limits and definitions of vessel types, were circumvented by the Kremlin's classification of the Kiev as an anti-submarine cruiser, a misrepresentation with which the Turks unprotestingly complied.<sup>8</sup> Soon thereafter, Soviet Captain V. Serkov, a legal specialist, wrote in the Soviet naval journal Morskoi Sbornik that "passage through the straits by any ships of states on the Black Sea does

not contradict the letter and spirit of the convention."<sup>9</sup>

(emphasis original)

Notwithstanding the fact that the Kremlin's substantial economic aid at a time of severe recession in Turkey and Soviet offers of arms during the American embargo had proven more than sufficient to wean conservative Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel toward a receptive posture on expanding political and defense ties with Moscow, the ascension to power of Republican People's Party leader Bulent Ecevit in January 1978 enabled the Soviets to shift their "neutralization" campaign into high gear. Ecevit, having campaigned for more than two years on a pledge to legalize the Turkish Communist Party if elected (a pledge, incidentally, on which he never made good), had been in office scarcely one month when he told the armed forces (to quote Marian Leighton) "that NATO membership could not assure Turkey's security and that a new defense policy must be formulated."<sup>10</sup>

It soon became apparent that Ecevit was considerably more favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union than toward the United States. In May 1978, U.S. President Carter was forced to abandon his plan for a special declaration by NATO member countries reaffirming their faith in the alliance when Turkey refused to comply. In London that same month, Ecevit told an audience at the International Institute of Strategic Studies of his disillusionment with "the peculiarities of American policy and the uncertainties affecting its credibility," asserting that: "We cannot be content any more with being evaluated as the armored

frontier guard of the Western Alliance."<sup>11</sup> The very next month, he was in Moscow, signing the long-anticipated "Turkish-Soviet Agreement on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation." Said the Turkish Prime Minister, "I am absolutely convinced that with the consolidation of such an atmosphere, alliances and differing systems will lose their characteristics of confrontation...."<sup>12</sup> Soviet economic aid to Turkey now surpassed that of any Western donor; in fact, Turkey became the largest single Third World recipient of Soviet aid.

Turkey's new National Security Concept, devised by the Ecevit government, comprised two basic components. First, in foreign policy and trade, it called for expanded relations with the Soviet bloc, the nonaligned countries, and Turkey's neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East. Secondly, in defense, it foresaw greater indigenous armaments production, diversification of foreign arms sources, a reduction in Turkey's NATO contribution, and a reconfiguration of the Turkish army to adapt to the "sources of imminent threat," which have "changed considerably in recent years."<sup>13</sup>

The new "imminent threat," of course, was Greece. A mounting agenda of unresolved bilateral disputes--over Cyprus, over sovereign rights to explore for oil in the Aegean, over airspace and ship transit rights, over the treatment of the Greek minority in Turkey, and over the perceived bilateral competition for unilateral advantage within such multilateral organizations as NATO and the EEC--led both Greece and Turkey to redeploy their

military assets somewhat in each other's direction. In what would appear to be a violation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (Article 13) and the 1947 Treaty of Paris (Article 14), Greece has been stationing troops since the 1960s on some of the eastern Aegean islands.<sup>14</sup> Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis openly admitted the existence of these forces after the 1974 Cyprus crisis, justifying the deployments as "defensive" in nature.

Turkey's response was to create a sizable "Army of the Aegean," including amphibious forces, stationed within rapid striking distance of the Greek islands. This separate Aegean Army command, established in 1975 as a new Fourth Army, is headquartered near Izmir on the island of Uzan Ada; it is the only Turkish military unit with no NATO commitments. As such, it stands alone as a symbol to the Turkish public (not to mention the armed forces) of Turkey's freedom from external control of its defensive assets, and is thus effectively immune to the urgings of the U.S. and other NATO countries seeking to demilitarize the Aegean dispute.

The Ecevit government's new security policy reflected the social democratic outlook of many Turks, who much preferred the atmosphere of detente and the economic rewards of Turkish Ostpolitik to a further dependence on the United States. The drift toward neutralism in the East-West context, the pragmatic adoption of a "multidirectional" foreign policy, and the Turks' creation of 'their own' army to deal with 'their own' adversary were all adjustments to the changing world; more than anything, they

showed that Turkish pride--hurt though it may have been--was as strong as ever.

Unfortunately for Mr. Ecevit and the Turkish people, however, the National Security Concept overlooked the most imminent threat of all: domestic political violence. In the two years preceding the September 1980 army takeover in Ankara, terrorism--by the far-right and the far-left--was claiming over twenty lives a day. Moreover, with the Ecevit government favorably disposed toward leftist elements, the conditions were optimal for Soviet-backed subversive activities within Turkey, actions which increased the level of turmoil, thereby undermining the centrist politicians and triggering an anti-communist overreaction on the extreme right.

In the mountainous eastern provinces of Turkey, where some six million Kurds have always made their home despite the constant and sometimes brutal government policy of economic neglect and prohibition of ethnic Kurdish self-expression, separatist agitation rose precipitously in the late 1970s. The Istanbul daily Tercuman reported on April 6, 1979 (p. 14) that, "It has been learned that Communist militant organizations linked with Moscow are involved in extensive activities in the region." Large caches of Soviet-made automatic weapons and artillery reportedly turned up in the hands of Kurdish militants.<sup>15</sup> Through its broadcasts over the clandestine Bizim Radyo in East Berlin, the Soviet Union promoted communism in eastern Turkey; the Turkish Labor Party, exiled in East Berlin since 1973, pledged itself to the cause of "proletarian internationalism."<sup>16</sup> The Kurdish Labor Party, whose members are

known as "Apoists", declared as its goal, "to establish a democratic people's dictatorship in an independent Kurdistan."<sup>17</sup> Or, as former (and subsequent) Prime Minister Demirel put it, the Apoists' "real purpose" was "to divide Turkey and to bring about a communist dictatorship in the east."<sup>18</sup>

If this sounds reminiscent of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's explicit declaration in 1940 that "the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union" is "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf"<sup>19</sup>--a statement followed seven years later by Stalin's attempted grab of eastern Turkey and northern Iran--it also seemed that way to many leading Turks who had theretofore found the budding Turkish-Soviet "friendship" unobjectionable. Demirel himself, who in March 1967 had proclaimed "a new era in our dealings with the Russians" in which "the last traces of hostility" have vanished,<sup>20</sup> proffered a very different assessment in June 1979 when L'Europe magazine asked him if he believed Moscow favored Turkey's destabilization. "Judge for yourself," replied Demirel. "I recall Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Iran. Yes, of course they want Turkey as well."<sup>21</sup>

And so the Kremlin came to be seen once again by many in Turkey as an expansionist adversary; only the tactics had changed since Stalin's day. The Soviets had tried to manipulate their ties with Ankara to their own geopolitical advantage, and they had pushed too far. The political pendulum in Turkey had swung Eastward to escape the unsatisfactory embrace of the U.S. and NATO, and now a similar phenomenon was taking place in reverse.

In the October 1979 parliamentary by-elections, Ecevit lost his governing majority, and Demirel returned to power, desperate to control the terrorism, revive the moribund economy, and resuscitate Turkey's ties with Western financial and political institutions, whose hard currency aid and military spare parts had proven irreplaceable in recent years. When his efforts failed to stabilize the country, the army commanders stepped in to advance these same objectives by far more drastic means.

To anyone reflecting upon Turkey's unhappy experience as a vital piece on the superpower chessboard, it should be obvious that wherever the Turkish political pendulum swings from here, it will not retrace its path back into an exclusive and dependent relationship with the United States. Renewed horror at the specter of Soviet duplicity cannot and will not erase the bitterness and mistrust which Turks have felt toward the United States, particularly since the arms embargo was imposed in 1975. Since the U.S. Government, by so penalizing the Turkish army, was in effect telling its NATO ally that a strong defense of the southeastern flank against Soviet aggression is not of paramount importance, any new American attempts to secure greater strategic cooperation with Turkey by amplifying "the Soviet threat" will have to be very convincing indeed if they are to overcome the mountain of Turkish skepticism regarding Washington's value as an ally.

Moreover, Turkey in the 1980s has a worldview far removed from that which it held in the 1950s or even the 1960s. During

the 1970s the Turks were pressed by necessity to explore a number of new diplomatic avenues in addition to their rapprochement with Moscow. While this observer will argue that Ankara's Islamic, Third World and Balkan political and economic dealings have not superseded the long-term preeminence of East-West considerations in Turkish foreign policy, no one can deny that these new diplomatic channels are here to stay and that they hold great significance for Turkey's future.

the Islamic factor

Seven centuries of Turkish adherence to Mohammedanism were not to be legislated away by Kemal Ataturk's radical secularization of the Turkish Republic after 1923. While all Turks could agree that religion and politics had proven a disastrous combination in the hands of the last several Ottoman Sultans, Ataturk's own deep animus toward Islam as a personal influence on Turks--an attitude which has been well documented by his many biographers--was clearly not shared by his Anatolian countrymen. Any doubt about this was removed after multiparty democratic activity was introduced in 1946. As Arnold Hottinger has written:

For (the village peasants in Central Anatolia) civilization was Islam; and as soon as democracy was given freer play--and they were actually asked for their opinion--they did not fail to let it be known that they wanted a certain activation of traditional Muslim religious and cultural life.<sup>22</sup>

The reassertion of Islamic self-expression in postwar Turkey, encouraged in part by religiously-tinged radio appeals to Anatolia's

peasantry by various political parties competing for their votes, created a new tension in Turkish politics which has existed ever since. One of the six "cardinal principles" sanctified by Ataturk in the 1937 Constitution is "secularism". To the extent that Islamic language and culture have been permitted to resurface since then, therefore, the letter if not the spirit of Ataturk's reformist blueprint for Turkey has been repudiated, and the moral legitimacy of the Kemalist army commanders as the nation's "guardians of Ataturk's principles" has been correspondingly weakened in favor of their Islamic conservative rivals.<sup>23</sup> It is no coincidence that each of the three army interventions --1960, 1971, and 1980--was immediately preceded by provocative religious activism, the most recent instance being a public rally of 80,000 people at which fezes were worn, Arabic script appeared on posters, youths wore prayer beads and children sold turbans.<sup>24</sup>

Insofar as the supremacy of Kemalism is at stake, then, Islam is a political issue in Turkey; and the tug-of-war between the conservative proponents of free religious expression and the military defenders of Ataturk's "modern" de-Islamized alternative may drag on for many decades to come. Crucial to an understanding of Turkish politics, however, is the realization that Islam holds very little potential as a force for political mobilization in Turkey. The key to this paradox lies in the uniquely personal and private nature of Islam in Turkey. Cultural matters, such as language, appearance, civil laws and philosophy were at the heart of Ataturk's European-inspired "Turkification" program,

and it is these concerns which formed the basis for "re-Islamization" (as it was then called) from 1946 on.

No one was questioning the propriety of keeping religion out of the affairs of state. Popular support for constitutional democracy has always been very high. Furthermore, because Ataturk forged a free and independent republic out of a corrupt and disintegrating empire, he and the army gained the loyalty and undying admiration of the overwhelming majority of Turks, who still regard the father of their country with the utmost reverence. Thus the potential in Turkey for an Islamic revolution similar to the one in Iran is virtually nonexistent.

How, then, to explain the political rise of Necmettin Erbakan and his National Salvation Party (NSP) in the 1970s? As noted earlier, the weakening of the two main centrist parties due to the army's thirty-month suspension of constitutional activity in the early 1970s redounded to the advantage of the four minor parties on the ballot in October 1973. The NSP, a successor to the outlawed Party for National Order (which Erbakan had formed in January 1970 after losing out to Suleyman Demirel for the Justice Party leadership), pulled 11.8 percent of the vote, which gave it 48 (out of 450) legislative seats.

But for the fact that both the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party perpetually failed to win quite enough seats to sustain a one-party government, Erbakan could never have risen to such a position of influence. After demonstrating the "life-and-death" power of a splinter coalition member by withdrawing

from, and bringing down, the government of Bulent Ecevit in September 1974--this in spite of Ecevit's enormous popularity in the wake of his bold decision to invade Cyprus in July and August--Erbakan joined in a coalition with Demirel's Justice Party along with a third party, the small far-right Nationalist Action Party led by Col. Alparslan Turkes. The three parties formed a Nationalist Front coalition government in April 1975.

Erbakan soon became very adept at having the electorally-minor NSP "tail" wag the Nationalist Front government "dog". Wielding his Assembly power like a blunt instrument, Erbakan fought for bureaucratic control over government ministries and budget appropriations, all the while seeking maximum media exposure with immoderate stands on the issues. For example, at a time of delicate diplomatic maneuvering over Cyprus, Erbakan sought an immediate Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, encompassing all of the newly-occupied territory. In the aftermath of the U.S. arms embargo, he strove to cut all of Turkey's ties to NATO, the EEC and the West generally. As the economy contracted under the strain of a severe foreign exchange crisis, Erbakan pushed for massive new investments in heavy industry. It was perhaps to be expected, therefore, that in the 1977 national elections, the National Salvation Party dropped to 8.6 percent of the vote and only 24 seats, reducing it to half its previous strength.

Three days after the 1980 army intervention, Necmettin Erbakan was arrested and charged with attempting to establish an Islamic

state; today many NSP members face similar charges of mixing religion and politics. It is expected that all will receive lengthy prison sentences. In spite of these severe measures, there have not been any reported protests or calls for Erbakan's release, even in Konya, his home and political base. It is also worth noting that in Konya, the center of Islamic culture in Turkey, until the coup the NSP controlled the local government with only a 37 percent plurality, based upon the most recent municipal elections.<sup>25</sup>

The implication of all this, of course, is that contrary to appearances from afar, there was no Islamic political groundswell to speak of in Turkey during the 1970s. Adding to this deception was the sudden flowering of Turkish diplomacy among the Islamic countries of the Middle East during this period. Islam as a factor in Turkish foreign policy is not the monolithic spiritual/political movement that some may have interpreted it to be. Rather, a number of basically unconnected factors--the post-Ataturk reassertion of Islam in Turkish daily life, the 1973 oil price/supply crisis, the JP/RPP political stalemate of the 1970s, the 1974 Cyprus invasion followed by the Turkish-American falling-out, and the rise of the Islamic movement as a global political force--have contributed to the erroneous impression that Turkey's political contributions to the international Islamic movement are a reflection of some new popular yearning in Turkey for religious, cultural and ideological solidarity with the Islamic world. They are not.

Since 1964, when all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia opposed Turkey's position on the Cyprus dispute (largely due to Turkey's long-standing friendship with Israel), Ankara has repeatedly traded support of Arab positions for Arab support of the Turkish Cypriots. At the first meeting of the Islamic Conference at Rabat in September 1969, the Turkish delegation was not welcomed as an equal among Islamic states, for obvious reasons; at the first six conferences the Turks participated only as observers. It was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the subsequent oil price quadrupling, and the summer 1974 Cyprus invasion which brought Turkey into a much more intimate embrace with the Islamic political movement. Moreover, after a few years, when the economic relationship had become so lopsided as to place Turkey at the mercy of its oil suppliers, the Cyprus/Palestine political quid pro quo lost its appeal for the Turks.

Evidence to support these assertions is plentiful and unambiguous. After Necmettin Erbakan pressured his coalition government partners into allowing Turkey to host the seventh Islamic Conference in May 1976, he treated the assembled delegates to a surprise guest speaker--Rauf Denktash, President of the newly-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. A majority of the 41 assembled Foreign Ministers then voted Conference approval for the Turkish position on Cyprus. The price? Turkey agreed to ratify the Islamic Conference charter as a prelude to attaining full membership; and secondly, it announced its willingness to allow the PLO to open an office in Turkey. The Turks

had previously agreed to neither move.

At the eighth Islamic Conference, hosted by Libya in May 1977, a Turkish resolution seeking a federated Cyprus was passed with only Syria, Lebanon and Algeria opposed. In return, the Turks switched their international position on Arab-Israeli issues from approximate even-handedness to a clearly pro-Arab position. In the United Nations, Ankara voted with the Arab states, even on the resolution condemning Zionism.

At the tenth Islamic Conference, held in Fez, Morocco in May 1979, the PLO (a long-time supporter and alleged arms supplier of the Greek Cypriots) abstained for the first time in voting on a moderately pro-Turkish draft resolution on Cyprus. Turkey's end of the bargain? Ankara voted to expel Egypt from the Conference and negotiated a definite timetable for the long-postponed opening of the PLO office in Ankara.

It is instructive to note the economic backdrop against which these political developments took place. The sequence of economic setbacks for Turkey from 1973 on was unrelenting and very severe. Turkey immediately ran down its reserves of foreign exchange, which had been plentiful due to the increasing remittances from Turkish workers in Europe, particularly since 1969. After the oil price shocks triggered a recession in Europe in 1975, these remittances decreased considerably. In desperation, Turkish leaders in 1976 and 1977 undertook massive borrowing of foreign exchange on extremely unfavorable terms. By the end of 1977 the country's borrowing capacity had been exhausted and its

economic growth rate had plummeted to zero. Lacking any further sources of earned or borrowed money, the government began printing it instead: the money supply grew by 39 percent in 1977, 37 percent in 1978, and an estimated 45 percent in 1979.<sup>26</sup> Needless to say, these actions were ruinous, as the rate of inflation averaged over 100 percent in 1980.

Because Turkey's foreign oil dependence is 85-90 percent, and because most of its industry is oil-powered, the government by 1975 had no alternative but to seek greater cooperation with its principal foreign suppliers, namely Libya, Iraq, Iran, the U.S.S.R. and Saudi Arabia. The promptness with which Libya came to Turkey's assistance at that time, and the agreements outlining "frameworks" for economic cooperation which Ankara signed in 1975 with Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, gave Turkish planners reason to hope that an entirely new trade pattern could be developed in which Arab oil resources and investment capital would be pooled with Turkish labor and relative technological superiority. This optimism lasted for a few years, during which time Libya provided one-fourth of Turkey's oil at concessionary terms, gave the Turks millions of dollars in donor aid, and provided employment for 20,000 Turkish workers under the terms of a signed labor agreement.

No other oil supplier came close to matching Libya's investment in Turkish goodwill, although Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait extended credits and loans (as well as some labor opportunities) to the Turks as their ability to pay for the oil became increasingly

problematic. By 1978 Libyan-Turkish cooperation was moving into the defense sphere; agreements were reached involving a joint venture to manufacture ammunition, the training of Libyan military officers in Turkey, the construction of submarines for Libya by Turkey, and various sales of small arms to Libya.<sup>27</sup>

By the late 1970s Turkey was heavily dependent upon the continued good graces of its oil suppliers, and the optimism of a few years before had dissipated considerably in the face of worsening economic circumstances. Bereft of financial assets with which to bargain for oil, the Turks found themselves under concerted pressure to oblige their oil suppliers with political assets instead. Libya's stance was the most interesting, since it represented the interests of the Islamic bloc by pressing Ankara on Palestinian issues, while at the same time working in concert with the Soviet Union in weakening Turkey's defense ties with the West. Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi made this latter objective abundantly clear in July 1978, one month after a visit to Turkey by Soviet Chief of Staff Ogarkov:

We want to draw closer to Turkey, but because of the Atlantic Pact, it has not been possible. The Arabs and the Third World countries are suspicious because they fear they might come close to the Atlantic Pact countries. For this reason, the only thing our Turkish brethren can do is to leave the alliance.<sup>28</sup>

When it soon became apparent that Turkey's National Security Concept did not foresee an early withdrawal from NATO, Libya (along with other OPEC members) reduced Turkey's time period on credit purchases of oil from 90 days to 30 days, causing

delays in oil deliveries just as the Turkish economy faced critical shortages.<sup>29</sup> As Turkey and the United States undertook to negotiate a new Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1979 and early 1980, Libya and Iraq explicitly conditioned future oil deliveries to Turkey on the question of whether Turkish military bases would be made available to the United States for use in Middle East operations.<sup>30</sup> When Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem in July 1980, the ambassadors of fifteen Islamic countries and a PLO representative came to Ankara, demanding that the Turkish government take "further practical measures" against Israel, which was universally read as meaning the severance of diplomatic ties with Israel.

In all of these instances of coercion by the Islamic oil suppliers, Turkey reacted exactly as it had when leaned upon variously by the Soviet Union and the United States: it refused to yield. By the time the generals took over in September 1980, Turkey had hosted the first NATO conference in Ankara in twenty years, and "the Islamic alternative" had shown itself to be no alternative at all.

#### a second chance for the United States

The Turks cannot be blamed for feeling that no powerful country can be trusted. Their experience, in modern times no less than in the Ottoman period, has vividly borne this out. Committed as the Turkish people are to democracy and peace (as opposed to socialist revolution or Islamic atavism), there

is no doubt that their strongest basic affinities and aspirations lie with the industrialized countries of the West. With this in mind, the following remarks concerning future U.S. policy are offered by way of summary and conclusion.

o The fact that the military junta is making pro-Western statements and gestures does not mean that American leaders can assume that all is forgiven. The Kemalists are reasserting themselves politically by trying to demonstrate to the people the correctness of Ataturk's European-oriented aspirations for Turkey. Moreover, the military has had an extremely difficult time trying to make do without American military spare parts, particularly for its combat aircraft. The economy's best hope of salvation is to retain the support of the German-led consortium of Western countries which has put together major financial aid packages each of the last two years.

Gen. Evren, who was feted in Moscow and escorted to the Leningrad and Volgograd military districts in May 1976, has surely not forgotten the contrastingly shabby and insulting treatment he received in the United States in June 1979, made worse when the Congress voted down a \$50 million aid grant to Turkey (303-107) immediately upon his return home. Present-day congenial appearances notwithstanding, Americans have a great deal of fence-mending to do, even with the Kemalists.

o It is probably safe to say that the next round of constitutional activity will reveal a Turkish political spectrum not much changed from the recent past, although the centrists will be institutionally strengthened and the extremists will be behind bars. To be really successful, therefore, American policy must be palatable to the largest single bloc of voters, namely the supporters of the Republican People's Party, until now led by Bulent Ecevit. There is a social democratic mainstream among Turkey's intelligentsia, and Washington can only benefit by paying close attention to it.

o Turkey's role in American East-West policy can be highly significant if a 1980s policy approach is fashioned. After two decades of rapprochement with Moscow, the Turks are no longer viscerally scared of an all-out conventional or nuclear attack by the Soviets, so it will be counterproductive to try to cultivate these fears. Far more credible will be a policy which stresses the U.S.S.R.'s use of subversion and terrorism to achieve its goals in Turkey and elsewhere; this approach fits in well with the Reagan Administration's special focus on Soviet-backed terrorism.

The U.S. should also steer clear of any attempts to cut Turkish-Soviet economic ties. In the first place, Turkey needs all the help it can get--and it is difficult to see any strategic benefit to the free world in having Turkey's social order disintegrate under economic duress. More importantly, however, Turkey and the Soviet Union just happen to be extremely compatible trade partners. The Soviets, whose foreign exchange reserves are limited, have made a ready consumer of Turkish tobacco, cotton, raisins, livestock, bauxite and aluminum. For its part, Turkey has not fared well with these exports in world markets, and has therefore been happy to trade them directly for Soviet assistance in building up an infrastructure for heavy industrial exports in the future. The fact that the Soviets help to "pay the piper" will not necessarily reduce the pro-Western faction's potential for "calling the tune" in Ankara. More likely, it will strengthen Turkey's independence from Arab Islamic economic pressures; it could also improve Turkey's chances of qualifying for EEC membership in the 1990s.

In fact, it may be very useful for Turkey to retain some cultural and economic lines open to the U.S.S.R. With some 55 million Turkic peoples in the Soviet Central Asian republics, the seeds could be sown for another "Poland" if Turkey's citizens continue to enjoy a measure of access to their racial brethren to the east, as they do now. Reports that the Reagan Administration

is stepping up funding for radio broadcasts into that region<sup>31</sup> indicate the possible utility of Turkish Ostpolitik in reinforcing this long-term effort.

o Just as U.S.-European relations are said to have suffered in recent years due to the repeated failure of American leaders to consult our European allies, Turkey has been accorded even less respect, and the U.S. has paid a heavy price. Turkish pride is easily slighted; the United States cannot profit from any policy which tries to impose its will on Turkey. Let us hope that we have learned this much from the past. Strategic cooperation, therefore, can only flourish in an atmosphere of reciprocity and respect--the Turkish army, after all, can be as proud of its tradition as any on earth. If Turkish bases are to be available for American troops in Middle East contingencies, the Turks must be brought more closely into the circle of consultation, intelligence-sharing and contingency planning. The Turkish officer who is commander of allied land forces in southeastern Europe, Gen. Sedat Gunesal, has hinted as much in recent months.<sup>32</sup> What is more, unless this is done, chances are that Incirlik will be a logistical "card" which can be "played" only once at best. It might be fruitful to link our efforts to enlist Turkish pledges of cooperation on Middle East contingencies with our efforts to make European oil-consuming countries contribute to the Persian Gulf security effort.

o Finally, in order to convince Turkey anew that the United States genuinely cares about its future prospects, channels will have to be used over and above the usual congressional aid appropriations. This is because Washington must be careful not to further offend Greek public opinion, what with a military facilities agreement still to be worked out and the hotly-contested Greek elections approaching (in which a Papandreou victory might end Greece's participation in NATO altogether). U.S. economic and military aid to both Greece and Turkey is tacitly governed

by a formula approximating a 7 to 10 ratio; it cannot be skewed significantly in either party's favor without intolerable repercussions.

Military aid to Turkey, moreover, should be given without strings attached regarding its use or non-use against regional "threats", to which the Turks would react only by redoubling their non-NATO Fourth Army buildup in the Aegean. Greece has recently demanded such restraints on American arms transfers to Turkey as a precondition of its own willingness to grant basing access to the United States; yet Washington can correctly --and responsibly--claim that Turkey's 1974 Cyprus invasion was a delayed reaction to the American restraints bluntly imposed in the 1964 Johnson letter. If Greek-Turkish issues are to be settled at all, any American participation will have to be as low-keyed as possible. Best to let them work it out bilaterally, as has been happening slowly but surely throughout 1981. The appearance of outside pressure only creates false expectations on one side and intractability on the other. In our dealings with both of these emotionally-charged countries, goodwill will be worth much more to American leaders than purely contractual leverage.

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The policy prescription is for subtlety and attention to local attitudes and trends. The prognosis is for a healthier strategic partnership so long as we bear in mind that the United States hasn't really done anything to deserve this second chance with Turkey. Others have simply proven themselves to be even more insincere than we. Let this difference be our saving grace.

## NOTES

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